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NOT SO OBJECTIVE INDICIA: WHY PUBLIC POLLING
AND BALLOT REFERENDA COULD CREATE A MORE
CONCRETE STANDARD FOR EIGHTH AMENDMENT
OBJECTIVE INDICIA ANALYSIS
Jonathan Marchuk*

INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”1 Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, these restrictions on punishment are applicable to the
states.2 Over the years, the interpretation of what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment has changed.3 Cruel and unusual punishments include those punishments
that are greatly disproportionate to the committed offense,4 but what is considered
a disproportionate punishment is not a static judgment.5 Instead, part of the proportionality analysis of the punishment to the crime looks to “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”6 To evaluate how society
views the punishment at a given time, the Court looks to “objective indicia” of the
nation’s opinion.7
This Note will focus on what the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” means
in the context of modern-day punishments. It will argue that the objective indicia used
to evaluate the current evolving standards of decency causes too much confusion
* Thank you to Jacqueline de Leeuw for all of her help and support in the editing process.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
2
Id. amend. XIV.
3
See generally Jeffrey D. Bukowski, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is
Not Beyond the Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419 (1995).
4
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366–67 (1910); see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005).
5
E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Roper,
543 U.S. at 563 (stating that the “standards of decency have evolved since Penry and now
demonstrate that the execution of the [intellectually disabled] is cruel and unusual punishment”).
Please note that the opinion of the Court uses the term “mentally retarded” in this case. In
later opinions of the Court, the term “intellectual disability” has been used to describe the same
condition out of respect, and this Note does the same when referring to the decisions using
this term. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).
6
Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01) (internal quotations omitted).
7
See, e.g., id. at 563–64.
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and leaves this portion of Eighth Amendment analysis up in the air. If the purpose
of the objective indicia test was to capture society’s moral standards,8 then the test
is failing to achieve its goal. With recent changes to the Supreme Court, objective
indicia have been, and will likely continue to be, interpreted in ways that do not
reflect current societal standards.9 In fact, current standards may encourage penalties, such as the death penalty, for the political reason of ensuring the punishment
remains constitutional.10
The future of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should be important to all
American citizens who want a judicial system that imposes fair punishments. These
protections may be even more relevant to specific groups such as minorities and
juveniles. Punishments considered cruel and unusual, such as the death penalty,
disproportionately affect racial minority offenders who commit the same crimes as
their white counterparts.11 Juvenile offenders have been held to be less culpable for
their crimes due to certain characteristics that accompany their young age.12 Because
of this, life without parole is not allowed for juveniles not convicted of murder, yet
juveniles can still be sentenced to de facto life sentences through long term-of-year
sentences.13 Current evaluations of “objective indicia” may not capture society’s
views on issues such as these and may continue to leave these groups, as well as all
other criminal defendants, vulnerable.
8

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)) (“Proportionality review under th[e]
evolving standards should be informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent.’”).
9
See generally Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 403 (2011); John Charles Boger, The Future of the Death Penalty: The Seeds
of Time, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 75 (2018) (evaluating the views of the death penalty for the
Court in 2018).
10
See Holly Honderich, In Trump’s Final Days, A Rush of Federal Executions, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55236260 [https://perma.cc
/4BU9-P3FW] (discussing the Trump administration’s use of the death penalty in the final year
of his term, ending a lapse in the use of the punishment by the federal government since 2003).
11
Enduring Injustice: The Persistence of Racial Discrimination in the U.S. Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Sept. 15, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and
-research/dpic-reports/in-depth/enduring-injustice-the-persistence-of-racial-discrimination-in
-the-u-s-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/A67M-ERSZ]; see Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without
Parole: An Overview, THE SENT’G PROJECT (May 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org
/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/LVQ2-Y3NL].
12
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (noting “[t]hree general differences between juveniles
under [eighteen] and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders” including: (1) lack of maturity and underdeveloped
sense of responsibility; (2) susceptibility to peer pressure; and (3) the fact that juveniles are
still developing their character and permanent personality traits).
13
See generally Megan R. Pollastro, Where Are You, Congress?: Silence Rings in Congress
as Juvenile Offenders Remain in Prison for Life, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 287 (2019) (discussing
juvenile de facto life sentences and their legality under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
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This Note will argue that “objective indicia” can be and seemingly is evaluated
arbitrarily.14 To stop the “objective” evidence evaluation from flipping based on the
makeup of the Court, the Court needs to establish a more unequivocal test. Objective
indicia should be evaluated by looking to readily available polling data and should be
furthered through direct voting measures when possible. This will allow for a more
objective measure when determining the number of states finding a punishment permissible. Furthermore, the Court should no longer look to jury decisions at all when
determining societal opinion. In making sure that state laws reflect the will of the people, state ballot measures should be encouraged, and state polling should be routine.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of the Eighth Amendment and what
objective indicia the Court has used in the past.15 Part II will discuss questions raised
by the current analysis of objective indicia.16 Finally, Part III will argue that to fix
the problems with objective indicia, the evolving standards of decency test needs to
be changed to allow for a more objective method of evaluation.17
I. THE HISTORY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Early History of the Eighth Amendment
The language of the Eighth Amendment comes from the English Bill of Rights
of 1689.18 Before making its way into the U.S. Constitution in 1791, the clause had
been included in several state constitutions and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.19
At its adoption, the clause was thought to bar punishments that were torturous or
barbaric.20 Even then though, there were concerns over future interpretations of the
14

See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death
Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1922 (2012) (“Eighth Amendment decisionmaking seem[s] ad hoc at best.”).
15
See discussion infra Part I.
16
See discussion infra Part II.
17
See discussion infra Part III.
18
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
19
Id. (noting that the inclusion of the clause “indicate[s] that the cruel and unusual
punishments clause was considered constitutional ‘boilerplate’”).
20
Id. at 840–41; see also Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893) ( “[T]he word
‘cruel,’ when considered in relation to the time when it found place in the bill of rights,
meant . . . such as that inflicted at the whipping post, in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, etc.”). But see generally Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 694
(1828) (upholding an act that allowed for whipping as long as the punishment was up to no more
than thirty-nine stripes at a time); Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264, 266–68 (1883) (upholding a
punishment of seven lashes for a man who beat his wife because the punishment of whipping
was recognized by States that adopted cruel and unusual punishment clauses in their constitutions). It seems at odds to claim that an original interpretation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause did not include whipping when one considers the practice of whipping
enslaved people. See, e.g., id. at 267.
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clause.21 One representative was concerned that the clause was “too indefinite”
while another was concerned that “it seem[ed] to have no meaning in it.”22 The latter
representative, one of the small minority opposing inclusion of the clause, was
concerned that the clause would ban necessary punishments.23 He noted that “it is
sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps
having their ears cut off,” showing that these were the types of punishments the
clause might be opposed to.24 The acceptance of penalties, such as the death penalty,
are further noted by the Fifth Amendment’s explicit contemplation of the deprivation of life as a punishment.25 Yet, even that representative noted that “[i]f a more
lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could
be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it,” signaling that
even those who disagreed saw the importance of limiting punishments that caused
unnecessary suffering.26
Early interpretation of the clause did not comport with modern standards.27 In 1824,
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (later renamed the Supreme Court of Virginia)28
held that a law allowing for free Black people to be enslaved and then subsequently
sold outside of the country as punishment was consistent with the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights.29 The court reasoned that slavery
was acceptable at the time of the clause’s adoption and was an acceptable penalty.30
In 1899, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether a
twenty-five-year punishment was a cruel and unusual punishment.31 The court held
that it was not, but did consider that the clause may bar other punishments than just
those that were “inhuman and barbarous.”32 It stated the possibility that the clause
may also prohibit punishments, including term-of-year punishments, that are “so
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.”33
The twenty-five-year punishment in that case was deemed to not be disproportionate
21

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782–83 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
Id. at 782.
23
Id. at 782–83.
24
Id.
25
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life . . . without due process
of law.”).
26
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 21, at 783.
27
See Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (1824) (holding that “the
ninth section of the Bill of Rights, denouncing cruel and unusual punishments” had no bearing
on the constitutionality of the punishment of stripes and being condemned and sold as a slave).
28
A Short History of the Supreme Court of Virginia, SUP. CT. OF VA. JUD. LEARNING
CTR., https://scvahistory.org/scv/supreme-court-of-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/AJ2Z-K3PR].
29
Aldridge, 4 Va. at 449–50.
30
See id.
31
McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899).
32
Id.
33
Id.
22
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to the offense as the punishment was for a repeat offender, and thus the safety of
society outweighed his minimal chance at reforming.34
Later, in 1910 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the important case of Weems v.
United States.35 There, the Court held that the clause did not allow a punishment of
fifteen years of hard labor for the falsification of a “public and official document.”36
While this punishment was not one that would have been previously considered
under the clause, the Court noted that the interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”37
B. The Evolving Standards of Decency Test
The decision in Weems set the stage for the Court to establish the modern test
for determining what is cruel and unusual punishment.38 The Court in Trop v. Dulles
was tasked with deciding whether a deserting soldier could be punished with the loss
of his citizenship.39 This punishment clearly did not fall into a category of punishments that would have been considered at the adoption of the Eighth Amendment.40
Drawing on the decision in Weems, the Court noted that “[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
maturing society.”41 As such, the Court was definitively stating that the standard of
cruel and unusual punishments was not solely tied to those punishments that were
outlawed at the signing of the Amendment’s adoption.42
Instead, the Court evaluated the humaneness of the punishment and its inhumane
nature.43 A punishment of denationalization could cause discrimination and result
in banishment and a stateless person.44 In essence, it could cause an individual to
“los[e] the right to have rights.”45 The Court looked to international opinion and noted
34

Id.
217 U.S. 349, 357 (1910).
36
Id. at 357–58. This case interpreted the language in the Philippine Bill of Rights, but
the Court found that since the language was based on the United States Constitution, the two
“must have the same meaning.” Id. at 367.
37
Id. at 378.
38
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
39
Id. at 87.
40
See id. at 100–02.
41
Id. at 101.
42
See id. at 100.
43
See id. at 102–03. But see Granucci, supra note 18, at 842 (noting that humaneness of
punishments was considered at the adoption of the Eighth Amendment but that “the clause was
rarely invoked” because “the ‘barbarities’ of Stuart England were not used often in America.”).
44
Trop, 356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958).
45
Id. at 102.
35
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that only two out of eighty-four nations surveyed allowed for denationalization for
desertion.46 In exercising its judgment, the Court found that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause, like the majority of nations, disallowed for this punishment even
though stripping someone of their citizenship was not encompassed by the original
meaning of the clause.47
Fourteen years later, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court considered and struck
down the imposition of the death penalty in a murder and two rape cases.48 Each of
these cases involved a black defendant who had received the death penalty after the
discretion of whether to impose the death penalty or a lighter sentence was left to
a jury.49 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that the Eighth Amendment includes the notion that the “punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary
society.”50 Justice Brennan believed that while the death penalty was a necessary and
acceptable punishment at the nation’s founding, it was no longer morally acceptable.51
The four dissenting Justices were concerned that the acceptability of the punishment
should be left to the normal democratic process.52 Justice Blackmun was particularly
troubled that the concurring opinions of the per curiam opinion were just arbitrarily
trying to reach the conclusion they wanted, showing that this is not a new worry to
Eighth Amendment analysis.53
The evolving standards of decency concept was further expanded on in 1976
when the Court decided Gregg v. Georgia.54 The Gregg Court reviewed whether it
was a violation of cruel and unusual punishment to execute a criminal under Georgia
law.55 Reviewing the previous Eighth Amendment cases, the Court noted that the
46

Id. at 103.
See id. at 102.
48
408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
49
See id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring) (per curiam).
50
Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam). Justice Brennan further noted that
“rejection by society . . . is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport
with human dignity.” Id.
51
See id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam). Justice Brennan considered where
the Court could get “objective indicators” of society’s current values and noted that the Court
should not look to legislative authorization of a punishment to establish societal values but
should instead look to the actual use of the punishment. See id. at 278–79.
52
See id. at 461–62 (Powell, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (noting that this judgment “deprives those jurisdictions of the power to legislate with respect to capital punishment in the
future” and that “[t]he normal democratic process, as well as the opportunities for the several
States to respond to the will of their people expressed through ballot referenda . . . is now
shut off”); see also id. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“The highest judicial
duty is to recognize the limits on judicial power and to permit the democratic processes to
deal with matters falling outside of those limits.”).
53
See id. at 413–14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
54
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
55
Id. at 158.
47
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“Eighth Amendment ha[d] not been regarded as a static concept.”56 Instead, the
interpretation of the clause had been expanded over time to include proportionality
and punishments such as hard labor and denationalization.57 Here the Court noted
that it would evaluate what the contemporary standards were by looking to “objective
indicia that reflect[ed] the public attitude toward a given sanction.”58 Objective indicia, in this sense, was supposed to reflect the will of the people.59
The Court was careful to note that it did not mean that society’s opinions on a
punishment were dispositive in ruling whether a punishment was cruel and unusual.60
Instead, the punishment should still comport with the Eighth Amendment’s purpose
of upholding “the dignity of man.”61 Within this, the Amendment still ensures that
punishments are not causing unnecessary suffering and that they should be proportional
to the crime committed.62 Here, the Court was still upholding the objective principles
of the Eighth Amendment’s purpose.63 Society’s opinion would not be the end all in
this decision, as there was still an evaluation of the objective nature of a punishment.64
As noted by the Gregg Court, conflict in the Eighth Amendment cases comes
from the judges’ finding that laws passed by the legislature violate the Constitution.65
The main benefit is allowing for an independent party to judge the validity of the
punishment.66 Still, the Court noted that deference is needed, and that the presumption is that a punishment is valid, because this punishment was adopted by the
legislature.67 Legislatures are democratically elected, so they are better representations
of society’s morals than a non-elected judge might be.68 Objective indicia are thus
the Court’s way of making sure the opinion of the people is not lost in the analysis.69
In deciding on the constitutionality of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the Court noted that it had to be careful.70 The Court was conscious of the fact
that a determination on a punishment violating the Constitution would be hard to
56

Id. at 173.
Id. at 171–72.
58
Id. at 173.
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)) (internal quotations omitted).
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See id.
65
See id. at 174.
66
See id.
67
Id. at 175.
68
See id.
69
See id. Justice White noted that the Court should be hesitant to categorically ban punishments under the Eighth Amendment because this would limit “[t]he ability of the people
to express their preference through the normal democratic processes, as well as through ballot
referenda.” Id. at 176.
70
See id. at 176.
57
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reverse.71 While normally the people could “express their preference through the
normal democratic processes, as well as through ballot referenda,” a decision on this
matter would make sure that this punishment could not be reinstated unless the
ruling was overturned or there was a constitutional amendment.72
Ultimately, the Court evaluated the objective indicia of state legislatures and
jury decisions.73 The democratically elected legislatures of thirty-five states, as well
as Congress, enacted new death penalty enabling statutes between the Furman and
Gregg decisions.74 State legislatures reflect the will of the people because the democratic process allows constituents to directly vote for representatives to reflect their
views during the legislative process.75 The will of the people can also be reflected
in ballot referenda.76 For example, in People v. Anderson, the California Supreme
Court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional, but this ruling was negated
by ballot referendum by the people of the state who adopted an amendment to their
constitution to allow this penalty.77 The Court also stated that juries are a “significant
and reliable objective index of contemporary values because” of the direct involvement of the people in the process.78 The jury system directly allows for the values
of the American people to come into play during sentencing.79
Even at the test’s adoption, there was some ambiguity on how the test was to be
interpreted.80 While the Court seemed sure of the death penalty’s acceptance by the
state legislatures, it noted that evaluating jury decisions was more complex.81 The
Court noted that “[i]t may be true that evolving standards have influenced juries in
recent decades to be more discriminating in imposing the sentence of death. But the
relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sentence does not indicate
rejection of capital punishment per se.”82 Instead of showing that juries, and as such
the people, were disapproving of the death penalty, the infrequency of the penalty
could show that people thought the penalty should be given out less frequently and
be reserved for the most extreme cases.83
71

See id.
See id.
73
Id. at 178–82.
74
Id. at 179–80.
75
Id. at 175.
76
Id. at 181.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See id.
80
See id. at 179, 181–82.
81
See id. at 179–82.
82
Id. at 181–82.
83
See id. at 182. The Court noted that 254 people had been sentenced to death since the
Furman decision to support the notion that juries were still supportive of the punishment. Id.
However, the Court did not go into an analysis of how frequently the punishment was given
out by juries when the accused was eligible for that sentence. See id.
72
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C. A Sampling of Modern Cases Dealing with Objective Indicia: A Complete
Mess of Reasoning
The ambiguity created by the need to evaluate objective indicia has caused
problems ever since Gregg. In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment allowed the execution of the intellectually disabled in an opinion that
was guided by a lack of a societal consensus against the punishment.84 Despite this
ruling, the Court explicitly stated that “a national consensus against execution of the
[intellectually disabled] may someday emerge . . . .”85 Thirteen years later, in Atkins
v. Virginia, the Court found that this national consensus had emerged—due to
sixteen states banning the death penalty for the intellectually disabled following the
Penry decision—and used this to help “inform” their own independent opinion that
the death penalty was an inappropriate penalty for the intellectually disabled.86 The
Court’s independent reasoning in Atkins largely relied on the fact that penological
justifications for the death penalty did not hold when applied to the intellectually
disabled, and that there was a risk that the penalty may be used on individuals who
deserved a lesser penalty.87 While the Court was swayed in Atkins, the Court also
considered the penological justifications of the death penalty for the intellectually
disabled in Penry, and was less persuaded when societal consensus did not seem to
express disapproval of the punishment like it did here.88 How informative the objective indicia was in these cases is uncertain, but it does seem to point to the fact
that this part of the test is not irrelevant.
Looking at whether penological reasons for a punishment apply to the sentenced
group would also be used to evaluate Eighth Amendment cases for juvenile punishments.89 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion stated that the
standards of decency in the country were such that the death penalty should not be
imposed on juveniles under sixteen.90 The decision looked to the “contemporary
standards of decency,” and explained how these standards matched the plurality’s
own judgment that this punishment should be categorically banned.91 To establish
84

492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). The Court in Penry also considered the reduced culpability
of intellectually disabled offenders and the lack of retributive reasons for punishment in these
cases but ultimately decided that allowing intellectual disability as a mitigating factor was
sufficient for these worries. Id. at 336–38.
85
Id. at 340.
86
536 U.S. 304, 314–16, 320 (2002). See also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).
87
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21.
88
See Penry, 492 U.S. at 338.
89
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565–66, 571 (2005); see also Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 71–73 (2010) (discussing the lack of penological reasons for implementing life
without parole on juvenile nonhomicide offenders).
90
487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion).
91
Id. at 822–23; see id. at 824 (establishing sixteen as the cutoff for the penalty because
there was a “complete or near unanimity among all [fifty] States and the District of Columbia
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the current contemporary standards of decency, the plurality first looked to state
legislative enactments and jury decisions, but then also examined the opinions of
professional groups and international legislatures, which it included as other categories of objective indicia.92
To evaluate the legislatures’ opinions on the death penalty for juveniles under
sixteen, Justice Stevens noted that this punishment was outlawed completely in
fourteen states, outlawed for some ages in eighteen states, and was legal regardless
of age in nineteen states.93 The plurality dismissed the nineteen states that allowed
the juvenile death penalty regardless of age.94 They claimed that these state legislatures never considered age in their enactments because if they had, it would have
been “self-evident” that the standards of decency would not allow the death penalty
for sufficiently young children.95 As such, the Court looked to the eighteen states
that had set an age limit on the death penalty and noted that every one of these states
required the offender to be at least sixteen years old at the time of their offense.96
Because of this, the plurality found a state legislative consensus on the matter.97 By
doing this, the Court opened the door to interpreting which state laws should and
should not be counted when determining a possible societal consensus.98 While the
in treating a person under [sixteen] for several important purposes,” including voting, driving
without parental consent, marrying without parental consent, etc.). But see id. at 865 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that elected representatives have a better understanding of their
constituents’ views than the Court and that the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
had just lowered the age (from sixteen to fifteen) that juveniles could be transferred to adult
court in Federal District Court just four years prior to the decision).
92
See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830. While looking to professional groups would largely
be dropped from future opinions, the Court did look to professional opinion in a more recent
case. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014). In this case, the Court was trying to determine
which individuals fall under the “intellectual disability” exception to the death penalty. Id.
The Court noted that “[s]ociety relies upon medical and professional expertise to define and
explain how to diagnose the medial condition [of intellectual disability] at issue.” Id. Whether
the Court was using a professional group as an independent indicator of objective indicia in
this case or was just noting that professional groups influence society’s opinions is unclear.
Compare id. at 712–13 (discussing how “professionals who design, administer, and interpret
IQ tests” use and interpret IQ results), with id. at 710 (noting that “this Court, state courts,
and state legislatures consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in determining
intellectual disability”), and Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017) (vacating an opinion
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals where the “medical community’s current standards”
for determining intellectual disability was not followed).
93
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826–29 (counting the District of Columbia as a state).
94
Id.
95
Id.; id. at 828 (using the example of ten-year-old children and stating that legislatures
that allow the death penalty for juveniles would agree that a ten-year-old is too young to
sentence to death). But see id. at 828 n.27 (noting two instances of ten-year-old children being
sentenced to death, including a Black child in 1855 and a Native American child in 1885).
96
Id. at 829.
97
See id. at 826–29.
98
See id.
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exclusion of laws was never contemplated in the Gregg decision,99 the Court found
this important to the analysis.100
In determining whether the punishment was acceptable, the plurality then looked
to how juries dealt with sentencing juveniles under sixteen to death and concluded
that this was unusual.101 Between 1982 and 1986, only five juveniles under sixteen
years old were sentenced to death.102 This was 0.3% of juveniles under sixteen who
committed homicide as compared to a 1.7% death penalty rate for homicide perpetrators over sixteen.103 The plurality believed that the proportionally low rate of
juvenile death sentences showed that the punishment was “unusual” in the sense of
being a rare occurrence.104 In this way, the Court found public support for a punishment based on the willingness a jury or other sentencer to give the punishment out,
at least as compared to other punishments.105 Again, this proportionality analysis
was never analyzed in a decision such as Gregg.106
Lastly, the plurality looked outside of the country in establishing a “societal
consensus” and noted that nations with Anglo-American heritage and “leading
members of the Western Community” had outlawed the practice.107 Looking to
international opinion would be dropped in future opinions, rightfully so, as international opinion may not coincide with national opinion which is the point of the
objective indicia analysis.108
Again, objective indicia are only used to guide the Court’s analysis of a punishment, and after its finding, the Court completes its own independent analysis of the
permissibility of the punishment under the Eighth Amendment.109 As noted by the
Thompson Court, the opinions of contemporary society may “weigh heavily in the
balance,” but that “it is for [the Justices] ultimately to judge.”110 While objective
99

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976).
See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826–29.
101
Id. at 815, 831–33.
102
Id. at 832.
103
Id. at 833 n.39.
104
Id. at 833 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (per curiam) (arguing that the death penalty for committing rape was “extraordinarily
rare” and was thus “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual”)).
105
See id. at 832–33.
106
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976).
107
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830. See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958)
(plurality opinion) (noting that the phrase “cruel and unusual” punishment is one of AngloAmerican heritage taken from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 and that the idea
dates back further to the Magna Carta).
108
See , e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (excluding international opinion as
an indicator of objective indicia).
109
See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
110
Id. at 833. But see id. at 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
only look to a national consensus and that “[i]t will rarely if ever be the case that the Members
100
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indicia are not determinative, the Court again agreed with the national consensus it
found and ruled that the punishment was impermissible.111 The plurality cited Eddings
v. Oklahoma, which held that youthfulness is a relevant mitigating factor when
applying the death penalty.112 The plurality noted that this class of juveniles was less
deserving of the punishment and that the penological reasons of deterrence and
retribution applied with lesser force to them.113
One year after Thompson, the Court heard and upheld the death penalty for
juveniles sixteen and older.114 In a decision that was later overturned by Roper v.
Simmons, the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky held that there was “neither a historical
or modern societal consensus” against the death penalty for those committing murder
at the age of sixteen or seventeen.115 The Court noted that the “Eighth Amendment
judgments should not be merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”116
In this case, the Court was concerned with the idea that the preferences of the
majority of the Court could affect the outcomes of these decisions.117 This decision
did not have an independent analysis by the Justices and instead relied on the
objective indicia in determining what the societal consensus is about a punishment,
and the importance of looking to the societal consensus when considering whether
a punishment is categorically barred under the Eighth Amendment.118
The Court first evaluated the objective indicia of laws “passed by society’s
elected representatives.”119 The Court looked to the thirty-seven states that allowed
the death penalty and noted that there was not a consensus because fifteen of the
thirty-seven declined to impose the penalty on sixteen-year-olds and twelve declined
of [the] Court will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the American people than
do their elected representatives”).
111
See id. at 838.
112
Id. at 834 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (explaining that
“youth is more than a chronological fact” and that minors are “less mature and responsible
than adults”)).
113
Id. at 836–38.
114
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
115
Id. at 380.
116
Id. at 369 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see also id. at 379
(“[W]e have never invalidated a punishment on [a proportionality basis] alone. All of our cases
condemning a punishment under this mode of analysis also found that the objective indicators
of state laws or jury determinations evidenced a societal consensus against that penalty.”).
117
Id. at 379
118
See id. at 369. But see id. at 379 (discussing proportionality analyses in other cases and
noting that the Court had never invalidated a punishment solely based on proportionality).
The Court explicitly considered the use of evaluating public opinion through polling in this
case but “decline[d] the invitation to rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations.”
Id. at 377. This Note seeks to show that legislative enactments and jury decisions are not as
certain as the Court seems to think they are.
119
Id. at 370.
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to impose it on seventeen-year-olds.120 The Court did recognize that juries were less
likely to convict a juvenile to the sentence of death, but noted that it was very likely
due to the fact that juries believed that a juvenile should rarely get the death penalty,
not that they believed that no juvenile should ever receive it.121
In 2005, the Court reevaluated the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles between sixteen and eighteen, and found that offenders under the age of
eighteen are not eligible for the death penalty.122 This case, Roper v. Simmons,
reestablished the importance of the Justices’ own opinions in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment.123 In establishing a societal consensus, the Roper Court noted that
while twenty states allowed for the juvenile death penalty for this age group, only
six of the states had ever imposed the sentence and only three124 had done so within
the past decade.125 This was similar to Atkins v. Virginia, which had outlawed the
death penalty for those with an IQ under seventy where twenty states allowed the
penalty, but only five states had actually executed such persons.126 Furthermore, the
Court cited Atkins which stated, “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”127 The Court went on
to find a consistent direction of change in society’s views on the juvenile death
penalty.128 The Atkins Court found a consistent direction of change, because after
Penry was decided, sixteen state legislatures decided to ban the death penalty for the
mentally handicapped (due to both the publicity of the case and the execution of
Jerome Bowden, a mentally handicapped man).129 Because there was a shift toward
banning the juvenile death penalty, as five states banned the practice in the fifteen
years between the Stanford decision and Roper, and no state unbanned the practice,
120

Id. at 370.
Id. at 374; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1978) (discussing the idea that
jury verdicts may or may not show disapproval of a punishment per se).
122
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).
123
See id. at 563–64 (stating that the Court will return to the interpretation rule quoted in
Atkins which was citing the rule stated in Coker v. Georgia); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.”).
124
Note that Kentucky would have been the fourth state to impose this penalty in the ten
years prior to the Roper decision, but the Governor of Kentucky commuted Stanford’s
sentence to life without parole. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. While the Governor is an elected
official, it is unclear how pardons and commuted sentences should be evaluated in the objective
indicia analysis.
125
Id. at 564–65. But see id. at 596 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that there was no
national consensus against the juvenile death penalty as there were “over [seventy] juvenile
offenders on death row in [twelve] different States ([thirteen] including respondent)”).
126
Id. at 564.
127
Id. at 565–66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
128
Id. at 565–66.
129
Id. at 565.
121
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the Court said that there was also a national consensus against this punishment.130
Just like refusing to count the laws of states where the legislatures may be unsure of
the law’s consequences, the consistent direction of change test was another step toward
opening up Eighth Amendment objective indica to more uncertain interpretation.
II. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE CURRENT ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE INDICIA
Current evaluation of objective indicia is ad hoc and would be better served by
looking directly to the citizens of the states.131 The test’s complicated and seemingly
arbitrary analysis has left the status of punishments such as the death penalty up in
the air when it comes to changes in state laws.132 This is particularly relevant with
the changes to the Supreme Court makeup and with Joe Biden’s election as president.133 With the change in the presidency comes the hope of ending federal executions.134 President Biden explicitly campaigned on abolishing the federal death
penalty and even pledged to “incentivize states to follow.”135 It is unclear if a change
in federal law would be the tipping point in showing a consensus for ending the
death penalty, but it could provide further evidence of the consistency of the direction of change in the country under Atkins.136 Even if federal law is not changed, a
moratorium on federal executions could be relevant under an analysis on how
frequently a punishment is given out.137 In July of 2021, the Justice Department did
in fact implement a moratorium on federal executions so that it could “conduct[] a
review of its policies and procedures.”138 If the moratorium holds for the entirety of
130

Id. at 566. The Court notes that this trend away from the juvenile death penalty was
particularly compelling due to the legislatures of the time generally cracking down on crime.
Id. at 566 (citing H. Snyder & Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report 89, 133 (Sept. 1999); Scott & Grisso, The Evolution
of Adolescence: A Development Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & C.
137, 148 (1997)).
131
See supra Part I; see, e.g., Bessler, supra note 14, at 1922 (“[T]he Eighth [A]mendment
decision-making seem[s] ad hoc at best.”).
132
See Bessler, supra note 14, at 1922.
133
Michael Tarm, Big Challenge: Biden Is Pressed to End Federal Death Penalty, AP
NEWS (Feb. 7, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-us-news-pandemics-health-corona
virus-pandemic-ad6b1681aaf4128aa5e3ca0e94672e45.
134
See id.; Madeline Carlisle, What Happens to the Federal Death Penalty in a Biden
Administration?, TIME (Jan. 25, 2021, 11:39 AM), https://time.com/5932811/death-penalty
-abolition-joe-biden/.
135
See Carlisle, supra note 134.
136
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
137
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (noting a minority of states
declining to impose capital punishment on minors under seventeen years of age).
138
Michael Balsamo, Colleen Long & Michael Tarm, Federal Executions Halted;
Garland Orders Protocols Reviewed, AP NEWS (July 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article
/joe-biden-executions-government-and-politics-9daf230ef2257b901cb0dfeeeb60be44.
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President Biden’s term, or a federal ban is enacted, will there need to be a reanalysis
of the punishment as a whole?
Regardless of what happens at the federal level, Virginia’s decision to ban capital
punishment could have a nationwide effect on the punishment by itself.139 This move
made Virginia the twenty-third state to abolish the death penalty.140 Although this
did not cause there to be a majority of states against the death penalty, this could still
affect the analysis in other ways. With this change, Virginia became the eleventh
state in the past sixteen years to outlaw the punishment.141 The Court previously
found that sixteen states choosing to prohibit the death penalty for the intellectually
disabled in the thirteen years between Penry and Atkins showed a consistent direction of change.142 It has also found that the smaller change of five states banning the
juvenile death penalty in the fifteen years between Stanford and Roper showed a
“significant” consistent direction of change.143 Using the Court’s past reasoning, it
is unclear why eleven states banning the punishment would not show a consistent
direction of change as well,144 especially if the federal government is added to the
count of “states” outlawing the punishment.145
One possible complication to the matter is that in 2015, the Nebraska Legislature abolished capital punishment, but this law was repealed by ballot referenda
directly by Nebraskan voters.146 In Atkins and Roper, the Court noted the importance
of the fact that no state that had already banned the relevant punishment went on to
reinstate it.147 This provided evidence of the consistency of the evolving standards.148
139

Whittney Evans, Virginia Governor Signs Law Abolishing the Death Penalty, A 1st in
the South, NPR (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/24/971866086/virginia-gov
ernor-signs-law-abolishing-the-death-penalty-a-1st-in-the-south [https://perma.cc/R3TS-NNXB].
140
Veronica Stracqualursi, Virginia Set to Become 23rd State to Abolish Death Penalty
After State House Passes Bill, CNN (Feb. 5, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02
/05/politics/virginia-to-abolish-death-penalty/index.html [https://perma.cc/6GM8-U6X3].
141
Frank Green, Abolition of the Death Penalty Will End an Institution Once ‘Part of the
Fabric of Virginia’, THE ROANOKE TIMES (Feb. 28, 2021), https://roanoke.com/news/abo
lition-of-the-death-penalty-will-end-an-institution-once-part-of-the-fabric-of/article_2565
5751-8508-5f9f-9039-34d006808bb7.html [https://perma.cc/G6AF-UNBK].
142
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002).
143
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005).
144
See id. at 565.
145
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010) (noting that federal law allowed for life
without parole for some juvenile offenders when analyzing the national consensus on the
punishment).
146
States and Capital Punishment, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty.aspx.
147
Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 ( “In particular, we found it significant that, in the wake of Penry,
no State that had already prohibited the execution of the [intellectually disabled] had passed
legislation to reinstate the penalty . . . . Since [Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)],
no State that previously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles has reinstated it.”).
148
See id. at 565–66.
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As such, a new ruling may be necessary to decide whether this is a strong enough
consistent direction of change.149 If the change in one state’s laws is relevant, one
has to wonder if there is a possibility for a state to game the system. Could it be
possible for a state in the future to ban and subsequently unban the death penalty just
to keep it from being ruled as a cruel and unusual punishment?150 However unlikely,
this does seem to be possible under current objective indicia analysis.
Another complication to consider is the possible rise in executions following the
Trump administration’s lead. States such as Arizona and South Carolina seem
poised to do just this.151 “Arizona ha[s] refurbished and tested a gas chamber and
purchased chemicals used to make hydrogen cyanide,” a poisonous gas, while South
Carolina has “authorized the use of a firing squad or electrocution in the event that
lethal injection is unavailable.”152 Is the contemplation and seeming approval of
these punishments enough to show that the societal consensus of these states is that
these types of punishments are not cruel and unusual?
All these questions bring about the even greater question of whether past Eighth
Amendment cases are even binding under stare decisis.153 In previous Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has evaluated the current societal opinions by looking to the
objective indicia of the current year.154 For example, the Court in Roper v. Simmons
noted that the objective indicia “provide[d] sufficient evidence that today our society
views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”155
Analysis of the number of states that ban a punishment, how frequently the punishment is imposed, and the consistency and direction of change are all subject to
change from year to year.156 If these and other objective indicia are subject to change,
why should an Eighth Amendment ruling that was guided by the previous state of
the country hold today?
This uncertainty shows how complicated current Eighth Amendment analysis
is when it comes to objective indicia. One should ask if something this important,
with the potential to put people’s lives at stake, should be this unclear and subject
149

See id.
See id. at 563, 566.
151
Hailey Fuchs, A Pause in Federal Executions, but Uncertainty About What’s Next,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/us/politics/biden-death
-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/REP8-JXWK].
152
Id.
153
See generally Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment
Death Penalty Context?, 85 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2007) (arguing that language of the Eighth
Amendment Supreme Court cases endorses applying the tests put forth by the Court rather
than just applying the outcomes).
154
See id. at 853–59.
155
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 (2002) (emphasis added)).
156
Id. at 564–67 (evaluating these factors at the time of Roper to show a national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty).
150
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to ad hoc reasoning. It is also important to note that while much of this Note’s
discussion has used the example of capital punishment, these questions apply more
broadly. This analysis is necessary for every potential punishment that could be
ruled to be cruel and unusual.157
III. OBJECTIVE INDICIA DOES NOT TRACK SOCIETAL CONSENSUS
The point of using objective indicia in the first place was to capture the will of
the people so that the judiciary could find a presumption in upholding society’s
moral values (unless these clearly violated the decency standards of the Eighth
Amendment).158 The legislative process is supposed to capture the will of the constituents who voted for them and could decide to vote them out if they disagreed
with their legislative enactments.159 Jury decisions are supposed to capture the will
of people as they are directly engaged in the judicial process, reflecting their view
on what punishments they chose or did not choose.160 These “objective” factors are
not objective in the way that they are being applied and interpreted by the Court.161
A. Legislative Enactments
Legislative enactments, by themselves, show little about what punishments
society believes are impermissible. The Court has been willing to disregard states
towards finding a legislative majority for a variety of reasons.162 In Graham, the Court
disregarded an overwhelming majority of state legislatures allowing life without
parole for nonhomicide offending juveniles because some of these states were not
sentencing juveniles to the punishment.163 To have a state legislature’s laws count
toward a consensus, it seems that the Court has fashioned a “use it or lose it rule”
as a state that does not use a punishment, or reserves it for very exceptional cases, may
be seen not to endorse it at all.164 This is in spite of the fact that legislatures them
157

For example, the Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama that juvenile life without parole was
a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). There
is currently a question of whether life without parole sentences for juveniles are functionally
equivalent to term-of-years sentences without parole that extend beyond the juvenile’s lifespan.
See generally Pollastro, supra note 13 (discussing de facto life sentences and their legality
under Miller). An issue like this may one day require an objective indicia analysis as well.
158
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
159
See id.
160
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (noting that jury decisions
“maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system”).
161
See id.
162
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
163
See id. at 62–63; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 609 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can
constitute a national consensus.”).
164
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia 428
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selves are not doing the criminal sentencing. However, it is unclear if this trend will
continue with the makeup of the new Court.
Furthermore, the Court has previously held that legislatures may not even be
aware of the consequences of their own laws.165 As previously stated, in Thompson,
the Court declined to count nineteen states toward the total of states that allowed the
juvenile death penalty as these states did not state a minimum age in their death
penalty statute.166 Instead the Court only looked at the eighteen states that established
a minimum age because the majority believed that any legislature that had contemplated the age issue would have set a minimum age.167 In essence, the Court found
that the legislatures of these states did not intend the consequences of their laws, and
that these laws were written incorrectly.168
In Graham, the Court noted that the state laws allowing for a juvenile nonhomicide offender to face life without parole did not mean that the “[s]tates intended
to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences.”169 Similarly to Thompson,
juveniles convicted of crimes other than homicide could be transferred to adult court
and then sentenced as adults, leaving them susceptible to punishments of life
without parole.170 The Court agreed with the reasoning in Thompson that this possibility “tells [the Court] nothing about the judgment these States have made
regarding the appropriate punishment.”171 In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated that
states had been increasing their punishments for juvenile offenders for the past two
decades before this decision, showing that this may have been an intentional consequence of the legislation.172
Rather than trying to establish and guess the intent of the legislators, the Court
could have gotten a better representation of societal values by looking to polling on
the issues. For example, Gallup polling shows that support for the juvenile death
U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.)) (“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sentence . . . may well reflect the humane feeling
that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme
cases.”) (internal quotations omitted); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388–89 (1972)
(Burger, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (noting that juries may be “increasingly meticulous” in
handing out the death penalty but that this does not mean that “only a random assortment of
pariahs are sentenced to death”).
165
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
166
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826–29 (1988).
167
See id. at 816. It does seem correct to assume that society would agree that there is a
sufficiently young age where the death penalty is morally reprehensible.
168
Id. at 826–29.
169
Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
170
Id. at 66.
171
See id. at 66 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826 n.24); see also Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 850 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that when there is an interaction of laws of this sort,
“it does not necessarily follow that the legislatures in those jurisdictions have deliberately
concluded that it would be appropriate to impose capital punishment on 15-year-olds”).
172
Graham, 560 U.S. at 109 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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penalty has consistently been fairly low.173 Prior to the Thompson decision in 1988,
a Gallup poll in 1956 showed that only 21% favored this punishment for adults and
juveniles under twenty-one.174 A 1936 Gallup poll with the same question showed
26% support and a more recent 2002 poll showed that only 26% supported this for
juveniles.175 While there is much less data on juvenile life without parole stances,176
polling could have shown a clear consensus that would have served as better objective indicia in these cases.177 The Court would not have to evaluate the intent or
lack of intent of lawmakers’ legislation if they avoid the intent question by asking
the public directly.178
Even if we were to take legislative enactments at face value, they may not reflect
people’s values on punishments at all. One has to wonder whether the acceptability
of different modes of punishment is a strong enough voting issue to be reflected in
a person’s voting choices. In fact, looking specifically at capital punishment, state polls
show that the moral acceptability of the death penalty is on the decline.179 Despite
this, a majority of Americans still find this punishment morally acceptable at 54%.180
When death penalty questions have been put up to vote on ballot referenda, the
majority of these outcomes have been pro-death penalty.181 Numerically, in the last
thirty-four ballot referenda, thirty-one of these outcomes were pro-death penalty.182
In some of these cases, the voters have disagreed with the legislatures of their states,
even in states that have bans on the punishment.183 For example, a 2000 poll in
Minnesota found that 57% of respondents supported the death penalty184 even though
173
Jeffery Jones, The Death Penalty, GALLUP (Aug. 30, 2002), https://news.gallup.com
/poll/9913/death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/AD39-63UL].
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
See generally Sheryl Pimlott Kubiak & Terrence Allen, Public Opinion Regarding
Juvenile Life Without Parole in Consecutive Statewide Surveys, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 495,
498 (2011).
177
See generally id.
178
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62, 65–66 (2010).
179
See National Polls and Studies, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/facts-and-research/public-opinion-polls/national-polls-and-studies [https://perma.cc/6ZYK
-3URT] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
180
Id. Even though most Americans find this punishment morally acceptable, a greater
majority of the American public believes that life imprisonment without parole is a preferable
sentence than capital punishment. Id. Even with Americans finding this penalty to be preferable
to capital punishment, the question is whether this punishment is acceptable at all under the
Eighth Amendment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976).
181
Austin Sarat, People Keep Voting in Support of the Death Penalty. So How Can We
End It?, THE CONVERSATION (June 23, 2017, 10:27 AM), https://theconversation.com/people
-keep-voting-in-support-of-the-death-penalty-so-how-can-we-end-it-79632 [https://perma.cc
/63SU-YVNG].
182
Id.
183
See id.
184
State Polls and Studies, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts
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this penalty has been outlawed in the state since 1911.185 Similarly, in Massachusetts, a 2003 poll showed that 53% of respondents supported the death penalty even
though the state abolished this penalty in 1984.186 It is not the purpose of this Note
to discuss the death penalty generally; all this does is to point out that legislative
enactments in this area may not reflect the will of the people and may not provide
a good sense of society’s morals.187 That is supposed to be the overall purpose of
objective indicia.188
The discrepancy between citizens of a state and government was also seen in
1972 when the California Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional.189 This ruling was later negated by ballot referendum by the people of the
state, who adopted an amendment to their constitution to allow this penalty.190 Because many judges are not directly elected, this furthers the point that ballot measures
can be used to get a more accurate picture of what constituents think about the
cruelness of a punishment.191
There is a further question of whether we should be looking at the legislative
enactments and attitudes of society today, or whether we should look to the future.192
Roper, using similar reasoning as cases such as Gregg and Atkins¸ showed that the
Court was partially concerned with the direction of state laws.193 Gregg noted that
the four years after Furman saw thirty-five states enact death penalty statutes.194
Both Roper and Atkins focused on the “consistency of the direction of change” of
state laws.195 While the Gregg decision did have greater support, the consistency of
-and-research/public-opinion-polls/national-polls-and-studies [https://perma.cc/445Z-TYE2]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2022). But see id. (noting that support for the death penalty in the state
of Minnesota saw a massive decline between the two years of study of 1996 and 2000). It is
very possible that in the last twenty years support for the death penalty is now aligned with
the state law. However, the point of this example was to point out that the voting population
may disagree with current law.
185
State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-fed
eral-info/state-by-state [https://perma.cc/6US9-U9M9] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
186
See id.
187
See, e.g., State Polls and Studies, supra note 184.
188
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2011).
189
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 891 (Cal. 1972).
190
See California, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-fed
eral-info/state-by-state/california [https://perma.cc/M8DS-USJW] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
191
See id.
192
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565–66 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 315 (2002)) (noting that the “consistency of the direction of change” in legislative
enactments can determine a societal consensus).
193
See id.
194
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976).
195
Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315). Justice Scalia, who was
joined by Justice Thomas, expressed the concern that looking to the direction of state laws in
Roper leads to the position “not . . . that [the] Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that
the Constitution ha[d] changed.” Id. at 608. However, the consistency of the direction of change
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the direction of change in Roper was much weaker at the time of the decision.196
Finding a national consensus where five states banned the practice in fifteen years,
and no state unbanned the practice, raises the question of whether the Court was
looking to the consensus at the time of the decision, or was projecting what the
consensus would be in the future if this trend continued.197 Looking to the direction
of where society will be in the future goes against the point of objective indicia
looking to societal standards today.198 Another possible explanation is that the Court
believes that legislation lags behind current societal views.199 If the latter is the case,
a more accurate “objective” evaluation of current societal views would be to check
the public consensus, as this would negate any lag between public opinion and
voting for officials to make legislative changes on these opinions.200
Projecting future societal values may be consistent with “the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” language.201 The idea that
society is making progress towards supporting only humane forms of punishment
makes sense when you reflect on the history of punishment in this country.202 When
looking at individual statistics however, it becomes less obvious that this is the case.203
Support for the death penalty as a punishment for murder has been as low as 42%
in 1966, as high as 80% in 1994, and was polled at 55% in 2020.204 Instead of believing that society becomes more humane over time, it may be better to understand
that the moral consensus of a society changes over time and allow this change to be
measured periodically using already available polling data and direct voting through
ballot measures.205 Objective indicia is not meant to be the ultimate decider of the
humaneness of the punishment.206 Instead, this is and should continue to be reserved
for the independent judgment of the Justices.207 As such, it is neither appropriate nor
would still be consistent with a view that the Constitution always looked to societal norms
to decide which punishments were cruel and unusual. If this were the case, the standard would
not have changed, it just would always have been relative.
196
Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155, with Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
197
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. Note that in Roper, the direction of change was just one part
of the objective indicia analysis as the Court also noted that a majority of states had outlawed
the juvenile death penalty. See id. at 567.
198
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
199
See id.
200
See id. at 186–87.
201
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
202
See discussion supra Part I.
203
See generally Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty
.aspx [https://perma.cc/FCH5-QTVA] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
204
Id. But see id. (showing that over the last twenty years, the percentage of the population that has found the death penalty morally acceptable has fluctuated).
205
See generally id.
206
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (noting that the point of looking
at objective indicia is to evaluate “contemporary values”).
207
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
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necessary to look at the direction of change of legislative enactments, as the Court
should be trying to evaluate the consensus of today; one of the easiest and best ways
to do this is to directly ask the people.208 The Court can and should be getting an
objective view through polling data and legislative enactments that have stood the
test of ballot measures. No further complicated legislative analysis would be needed
once the Court finds a consensus of the fifty states.209
B. Jury Verdicts
Jury decisions, and the jury process, are also poor reflections on society’s views
on cruel and unusual punishments. As such, they should not be used as objective
indicia for the Court to freely interpret.
1. Problems in Constructing the Jury Pool
Even in the onset of jury selection, there are problems with thinking that jury
decisions are representative of society.210 Juries are supposed to be a random
sampling of citizens, but many things can stop this from being true.211 For one, the
lists of the pool of citizens that a random group of potential jurors is selected from
may be under representative of some groups or ideals.212 For instance, registered
voting lists, which are often used, may under-represent racial minorities.213 This is
especially problematic when these same minority groups are more likely to face
potentially cruel and unusual punishments such as the death penalty.214 Some states
try to account for under-represented groups by supplementing their voter registration
lists with other lists such as driver registration records.215 While supplementation
may help, these other lists may also be incomplete and may still allow for a group,
specifically one with strong Eighth Amendment views, to be missed.216
(explaining that while there may be a significant change in societal values, it is up to the
Supreme Court to go against its precedent); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
208
See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 594 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 20.
209
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002) (relying on polling data and
legislative evidence to show a consensus against executing intellectually disabled individuals).
210
See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Representative Jury Requirement: Jury Representativeness and
Cross Sectional Participation from the Beginning to the End of the Jury Selection Process,
23 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. gp1, gp4 (1999).
211
See id. at gp2.
212
See id.
213
See id.
214
See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 11.
215
See Fukurai, supra note 210, at gp5; see also, e.g., How a Jury is Selected, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/jury/guide/jury-selection [https://perma.cc/L27D-JEV3]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
216
See Fukurai, supra note 210, at gp5 (noting that driver registration records still underrepresent some groups, including women and the elderly).
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Even if jury lists were exhaustive, other things, such as socio-economic status
(and by extension race), might prevent a jury pool from being a truly random sample
of citizens.217 Citizens with lower incomes may have less stable living situations
causing their juror summonses to go undelivered.218 Those of a lower socio-economic status may also be unable to afford giving up days of work and may try to
avoid jury duty.219 Some individuals are fortunate enough to be able to show that
jury duty will result in financial hardship, but this still means their voice will not be
reflected in jury pools even when selected.220 All of these contribute to the very real
problem of jurisdictions being unable to fill jury pools with populations representative of their demographic areas.221 As such, even if we could ensure the soundness
of the rest of the jury selection process, there may still be problems with the Court
looking to jury determinations.
2. Problems with Voir Dire
While the purpose of this Note is not to critique the voir dire process, one may
question the consequences of weeding out jurors when jury decisions are being used
to obtain reliable evidence of societal views on a subject. Regardless of Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment questions, the voir dire process likely
produces juries that are less representative of societal views than the continual use
of random sampling would.222 There is a whole industry of jury consulting to help
attorneys strike jurors that may find an undesirable result.223 When high stakes cases,
217

Ashish S. Joshi & Christina T. Kline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with
Individual Consequences, A.B.A. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litiga
tion/committees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-in
dividual-consequences/.
218
Id.
219
Alexander E. Preller, Jury Duty Is a Poll Tax: The Case for Severing the Link Between
Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1–2 (2012) (noting
that inadequate compensation for some “who are self-employed, hold multiple part-time jobs,
or are dependent on tips as part of their compensation” is “critical” and may cause these people
to avoid jury duty).
220
See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223–24 (1946) (allowing the exclusion
of jurors when “financial embarrassment is such as to impose a real burden and hardship”).
The Court in Thiel was worried about the potential of excluding a large portion of the community from jury pools as this would undermine the democratic nature of the system. Id. at
223–24. While only allowing selective exclusions from jury duty may have a smaller effect on
undermining the democratic nature of juries, one may wonder if there is still an undermining
effect, nonetheless. See id.
221
See Joshi & Kline, supra note 217.
222
Jon Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should it Be Conducted to Ensure That Our Juries are
Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 65, 73 (1976).
223
See generally Walter F. Becker, Jr., How to Use a Jury Consultant: A Guide for Trial
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such as a death penalty case or life without parole for a juvenile, are being litigated,
these types of tactics are more likely to be used.224 This gives even less reason for
one to believe that these jury decisions should be used to represent society’s views
on cruel and unusual punishments.
Things get even worse for using jury verdicts as objective indicia when one
considers the practice of “death qualifying” juries.225 Death qualifying allows courts
to choose not to include those jurors that are categorically opposed to the death
penalty, whether this is only for juveniles or across the board.226 It is self-evident
that if you take out those potential jurors that are opposed to the death penalty, jury
verdicts will be non-representative of those people.227 In 2020, a Gallup poll found
that 40% of Americans viewed the death penalty as morally wrong.228 While the
percentage of people who find a punishment morally unacceptable and those who
would never agree to impose the punishment may not be the same, it is again clear
that there is a non-zero portion of people being affected.229 Again, the purpose of this
Note is not to evaluate processes such as death qualification, but rather, it is important to note that a death qualified jury will never be representative of the views of
Americans who believe the death penalty should never be imposed.
Furthermore, this issue was clarified to allow for the exclusion of jurors who
were unsure if their opinions about the death penalty would interfere with either
their assessment of the case “or what they deem to be a reasonable doubt.”230 The
Court ruled that those who can be excluded from the jury pool in these cases “do not
constitute a ‘distinctive group’” and so they can be excluded without violating the
fair cross section requirement of juries.231 This just goes to expand the group of
people not being represented by the Court’s current process of evaluating objective
indicia and will affect the aggregate amount of death penalties being given out.232
Attorneys, 50 LA. BAR J. 426 (2003) (providing advice and insight into how trial attorneys
can utilize jury consultants and what to look for in a consultant).
224
See id. at 428.
225
See generally Katherine E. Berger, Death Qualifications of Juries as a Violation of the
Social Contract, 12 WASH. UNIV. JURIS. REV. 115 (2019).
226
Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517–18 (1968).
227
Id. at 519–20. But see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986) (doubting the
efficacy of studies modeling the opinions and behavior of potential jurors when they are not
sworn under oath).
228
See Gallup Poll: Record-Low Percentage of Americans Now Find Death Penalty
Morally Acceptable, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (June 24, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/news/gallup-poll-record-low-percentage-of-americans-now-find-death-penalty-morally
-acceptable.
229
Cf. Berger, supra note 225, at 140–41.
230
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50 (1980). See generally Wainwright v. Witt, 496 U.S.
412–13 (1985).
231
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 177.
232
See Berger, supra note 225, at 140–41.
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3. Carrying Out of Sentences
The politicization of punishments that could be considered cruel and unusual
punishment is also problematic, especially when evaluating the number of times a
punishment is carried out to determine if it is unusual.233 Part of unusualness is the
infrequency of the punishment being given out.234 In some cases, the Court actually
looks to the number of times that the sentence is carried out.235 The problem is, there
are a variety of reasons that a punishment may or may not be carried out.236 For one,
clemency may be granted to individuals facing the death penalty.237 In this way, a
governor, president, or administrative board may change a death penalty sentence
to a lesser sentence and spare the individual from death.238 Looking to the actual
numbers of executions that are actually carried out will miss those individuals that
are granted clemency.239 At the time of writing this Note, states have granted a total
of 294 clemencies to individuals sentenced to death since 1976, with the State of
Illinois accounting for 187 of these clemencies.240 A last minute grant of clemency
seems opposed to the idea of objective indicia reflecting the will of the people, as
the will of the people was already supposed to be reflected in their jury verdict.241
One may argue that governors and presidents are democratically elected, so their
grants of clemencies may also be reflective of the will of the people.242 This fails to
account for the fact that there may be further politically motivated reasons for clemency.243 For example, in 1999 Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan granted clemency to
Darrell Mease simply because he was asked to by Pope John Paul II.244 The governor
233

See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1988) (citing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (per curiam)).
234
Id.
235
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005).
236
See Richard C. Dieter, The Declining Role of the Death Penalty in the U.S., 50 CRIM.
L. BULL. art. 5, at 3 (2014).
237
See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-re
search/clemency [https://perma.cc/HGR2-8ZUM] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
238
See id.
239
See id.
240
See id. Note that these numbers are as of February 2021. For a complete list of clemencies and the reasons they were granted, see List of Clemencies Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/clemency/list-of-clemencies-since
-1976 [https://perma.cc/TVE8-D4FY] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
241
Again though, the effectiveness of jury verdicts reflecting the will of the people in
cruel and unusual punishment cases may be questioned. See discussion supra Section III.B.
242
Cf. Ethan J. Lieb & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications for Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 463, 476 (2019)
(discussing the President as a fiduciary meant to act for the benefit of the public and how the
Executive’s pardon power must therefore serve the public’s interest).
243
Brianna Vollman, Note, Keeping up with the Commutations: The Judiciary’s Authority
After an Exercise of Executive Clemency, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2020).
244
Stephanie Simon, Pope’s Appeal for Mercy Saves Murderer’s Life, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29,
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considered the grant “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to honor the pope’s request,”
something that is completely unrelated to the governor’s own views as a democratically
elected official.245 While this is a case where the governor explicitly stated his reason
being unrelated to his constituents, it is unclear how many of the other 293 clemencies
were decided for similar political reasons but claimed to be for something else.246
The politicization of the process can be seen in the recent federal executions put
forth by the Trump administration.247 There had been a sixteen-year break from
federal executions prior to 2019.248 It was not until 2019 that federal executions were
scheduled to start being carried out again.249 As noted by Ngozi Ndulue, director of
the Death Penalty Information Center, there may have been political pressure at play
with which executions were scheduled.250 During the summer of 2020’s Black Lives
Matter protests around the country, the scheduled executions were all white men.251
Following this, four African-American prisoners were scheduled to be put to death.252
The recent executions, such as that of Lisa Montgomery (the first woman to be
federally executed since 1953), were being pushed through by the Trump administration at a time when he had already been voted out of office.253 President Joe Biden
has already promised to push to end federal executions during his term.254 The current
way objective indicia is looked at, President Trump may have ensured that the federal government is viewed as another pro-death penalty jurisdiction when in reality,
he may be the modern outlier, who had also already been voted out by the people.255
1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-jan-29-mn-2872-story.html
[https://perma.cc/SSE5-3R83].
245
Id. (stating that the Republican floor leader in the Missouri Senate believed that it
would have been more appropriate if the governor had started a dialogue on the issue rather
than granting Mr. Mease clemency). But see id. (noting that the governor was moved by the
Pope’s Mass where he spoke out against the death penalty indicating that this was at least
partially reflective of the governor’s own views).
246
See generally List of Clemencies Since 1976, supra note 240 (discussing other reasons
that clemency has been said to have been used).
247
See Honderich, supra note 10.
248
See id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
See Cheryl Corley, U.S. Executes Lisa Montgomery, The Only Woman On Federal Death
Row, NPR (Jan. 12, 2021, 11:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/12/955984890/u-s-exe
cutes-lisa-montgomery-the-only-female-on-federal-death-row [https://perma.cc/H65Y-4KK3].
254
See Honderich, supra note 10. See generally Marcia Brown, How Biden Can End Trump’s
Macabre Execution Spree, THE AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 22, 2020), https://prospect.org/day-one
-agenda/how-biden-can-end-trumps-macabre-execution-spree/ [https://perma.cc/4PZN-6D4W].
255
See Honderich, supra note 10 (noting that the Trump administration is the first in a
century “to carry out federal executions in the midst of a political transition[,] with a lameduck president”). As a side note, one might question why unusual has to mean rare at all. It
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All of this points to the ineffectiveness of using jury verdicts and the actual
number of times a sentence has been carried out as indicators of objective indicia.
Instead, there needs to be a more direct approach to indicate how society generally
feels about these punishments. Just like with legislative enactments, this can be more
effectively brought about with national and state polling data, which is already
available in many cases, and state ballot measures.256 Direct polling and ballot
measures are not susceptible to political candidates who may push for clemency or
may push for the scheduling of executions.257 Instead, they are more direct representations of the people’s views as we do not have to worry about the strength of voting
issues when state ballot measures allow for voting on the single issue of the punishment’s permissibility.258 This will also avoid the problems of excluding those from
jury pools who would never agree to impose the penalty of death under any circumstances,259 and will lessen problems of financial hardships and delivering jury
summonses for some hard-to-locate jurors.
All people need to be reflected to get a true idea of society’s views on which
punishments are cruel and unusual. If the Justices want to look to society’s morals
to help guide their own opinion, they should look directly to the people, rather than
looking through a process that can and has been easily manipulated.
CONCLUSION
Objective indicia are not dispositive to answering Eighth Amendment questions
as to what punishments are cruel and unusual, but they do inform the Court as to the
evolving standards of decency in our society. As such, it is important that objective
indicia actually reflect the will of the people. Currently, objective indicia are evaluated
seems consistent to think that a punishment may be rare because only a very select few could
ever be deserving of a punishment. It is then unclear why a punishment’s infrequent use would
show that society believes that no person could be deserving of that punishment.
256
See discussion supra Section III.A.
257
But see Elaine S. Povich, Big Money Pours into State Ballot Issue Campaigns, THE
PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis
/blogs/stateline/2016/09/23/big-money-pours-into-state-ballot-issue-campaigns [https://perma
.cc/MYH8-YYXT] (explaining how state ballot campaigns are increasingly targeted by special
interests groups that spend hundreds of millions trying to influence voters in ballot measures).
While political campaigns may affect ballot measures and affect their ability to track actual
societal views, this is the same problem faced in the elections process. See id. The problem
thus seems related to a separate issue of money in politics and is not necessarily a problem
with these ballot procedures.
258
Cf. Austin Sarat, When the Death Penalty Goes Public: Referendum, Initiative, and the
Fate of Capital Punishment, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 391, 412–13 (2019) (discussing how referenda allow citizens to directly express their opinions overruling government actions that are
either more lenient or strict than public opinion).
259
See generally Berger, supra note 225.
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by looking to legislative enactments and jury decisions. Neither of these do a good
job at showing how society currently feels about a punishment. Legislative enactments are sometimes disregarded by the Court if the punishments are not being used.
Also, the Court sometimes disregards inexplicit legislative enactments when it is not
clear that they are actually endorsing a punishment or not. Furthermore, there are
questions of whether a legislative enactment by a state legislature reflects the will
of the people on issues such as these, where they may not be strong voting issues.260
Jury verdicts are also not reflective of society’s views, as we do not often get truly
representative juries through the voir dire process and are unable to reach all potential jurors.261 Jury verdicts are especially not representative for applications of the
death penalty, where there is death qualification that weeds out those jurors who
would never agree to impose this sentence.262
As a result, the best way for the Court to get a true understanding of what society
thinks about an issue is to look to polling data, which for many topics is already
available. This shows directly how the people feel about the issue and lessens many
of the problems with looking to legislative enactments and jury verdicts. State ballot
measures can also show voter preferences about any questionable punishment and
should be encouraged. While this may only provide evidence of opinions in a certain
state, it would limit problems of interpreting the intent of legislatures that the Court
has previously dealt with. At the end of the day, the Supreme Court will get to use
its final judgment on the permissibility of potentially cruel and unusual punishments,
but to ensure that the Court is transparent about how the people actually feel about
the issue, the way objective indicia are determined under the Eighth Amendment
needs to be changed.
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See generally Sarat, supra note 258.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
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